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[To Schmooze participants: With many thanks for your willingness to read this, I provide here 
an edited version of a longer project; specifically, you have an introduction, Part I, and Part IV of 
the anticipated paper.]  
Introduction 
 
 An unacknowledged tension exists today between two central, unquestioned axioms of 
Article III jurisprudence. One is the familiar black-letter law rule that a “plaintiff generally must 
assert his own rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or 
interests of third parties.”1 This principle takes root in Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in 
Marbury v. Madison, which directed federal courts “solely to decide on the rights of 
individuals.”2 The second axiom is implicit in numerous Supreme Court precedents dating back 
decades yet rarely articulated explicitly. It holds that individual litigants can secure relief not 
merely for violations of their own individual rights, but also for infringements of the 
Constitution’s institutional architecture—i.e., states’ rights or branches’ prerogatives. Judges 
routinely invoke principles of separation of powers
3
 or federalism
4
 that seem to adhere in 
institutions to award relief to individual litigants. However hallowed they might be, these two 
axioms coexist only uneasily. For structural constitutional principles are rarely conceived in 
individualized terms. Rather they align more closely with “generalized grievance[s] shared by a 
large number of citizens in a substantially equal measure”5 that Article III is crafted to keep at 
bay. 
 
In a little-noticed opinion handed down in penultimate week of the October Term 2010, 
the Supreme Court took up this tension, and resolved it unanimously in favor of justiciability.
6
 
Writing for the Court in Bond v. United States, Justice Anthony Kennedy held that “[a]n 
individual has a direct interest in objecting to laws that upset the constitutional balance between 
the National Government and the States when the enforcement of those laws causes injury that is 
concrete, particularized, and redressible.”7 Individuals are also protected by the separation of 
powers, observed Kennedy, and hence “not disabled from relying on [that] principl[e] in 
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otherwise justiciable cases and controversies.”8 Bond in effect means that an individual 
otherwise properly situated for Article III purposes can involve not just her own constitutional 
interests but also those of our shared constitutional institutions as grounds for relief.  
 
Bond occasioned thunderous silence in the law reviews.
9
 Perhaps this inattention is 
understandable. Bond upset no statutory or doctrinal status quo. While hardly a mundane sight, 
individual plaintiffs do invoke structural constitutional flaws for relief periodically in federal 
court—and indeed have done so for nearly a century.10 Nor did Bond occasion any downstream 
policy upset. Given the historical pedigree of individual standing in structural constitutional 
litigation, its Article III holding presages no large reordering of federal-court litigation. To the 
contrary, the brevity and unanimity of Justice Kennedy’s opinion suggested the Court was 
merely resolving a trivial housekeeping matter in the “incoherent and confusing” field of 
standing.
11
  
 
But the question whether individual litigants should have standing to raise structural 
constitutional questions is more complex than Bond and commentators suppose. At its core, this 
Article advances the claim that individuals are typically ill-positioned to vindicate structural 
constitutional values. In lieu of the current Article III disposition, I instead propose the following 
rule: when an individual litigant seeks to enforce a structural constitutional principle that 
immediately redounds to the benefit of an official institution, and there is no reason the latter 
could not enforce that interest itself, a federal court should not permit the individual litigant to 
allege and obtain relief on the basis of the separation of powers or federalism. In the mine run of 
cases, Congress, the executive branch, or a state will be available to vindicate a structural 
principle. The relevant institution should be left to elect whether or not to do so. In such 
instances, individual litigants should be categorically barred from obtaining relief based on the 
traducing of governance structures held in common. Consistent with my proposed rule, however, 
I further identify a subset of cases in which individuals ought to have standing. In these cases, 
litigants assert a due process-like interest isomorphic with Article III of the Constitution.
12
 The 
individual interest and the structural principle wholly overlap in such litigation. Additionally, no 
official actor is available to enforce the structural principle. In such instances, standing should be 
permitted for individual litigants.  
 
My analysis of individual standing for the structural constitution rests on two pillars, one 
doctrinal and the other sounding in political-economy terms. I first consider the Court’s tangled 
constitutional and prudential standing framework,
13
 a jurisprudential morass famous for its 
“unpredictability and ideological nature.”14 Given that complexity, it should be no surprise that 
precedent can be leveraged into a plausible case either for or against individual standing for the 
structural constitution. Resisting the jurisprudence’s entropic tendency, I contend that the Bond 
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Court’s analysis failed to account for several of Article III’s foundational values. Even on narrow 
doctrinal grounds, it is unjustified. Large lacunae mar Bond’s constitutional analysis while 
prudential concerns insistently list against individual standing. 
 
The second element of my analysis moves beyond standing’s doctrinal moorings to 
situate individual standing for the structural constitution in a political economy and institutional 
context. Drawing on public-choice and political science tools, I query whether such standing will 
indeed vindicate the separation of powers and federalism. Application of such tools yields even 
yet more reason to be skeptical of individual standing for the structural constitution. My analysis 
compares the effects of individual and institutional standing. Individuals’ incentives, I argue, 
conduce away from the goals of structural constitutionalism, and are indeed likely to exacerbate 
rent-seeking pathologies in the legislative process. Counterintuitively, opening the door to more 
individual litigants does not necessarily generate more compliance with the structural 
constitution. But in contrast to private litigants, political institutions have meaningful cause to 
resist the urge to challenge desirable institutional innovations, and to invoke judicial supervision 
only when truly warranted. Although very clearly far from perfect, institutional incentives are 
likely to generate better outcomes than individual incentives to sue. In net, this (concededly 
rough) comparative analysis suggests that structural constitutional values are best entrusted to the 
institutions they directly benefit, not chanced on the happenstance of which individual litigants 
find self-serving gain in their invocation. 
 
Working hand in glove, these ‘internalist’ doctrinal and ‘externalist’ political economy 
challenges suggest that individual litigation of structural constitutional rules is more likely to 
distort than to sustain a constitutionally appropriate equilibrium. If structural constitutional 
questions are to be adjudicated in federal court at all, it would be wise to delimit such jurisdiction 
to cases filed by those institutions best placed to raise all relevant considerations—the states or 
political branches that are ultimately the immediate objects of constitutional solicitude.  
 
The analysis proceeds in five steps. Part I begins by defining the domain of relevant 
inquiry, delineating the class of cases in which an individual litigant seeks to vindicate the 
structural constitution. Part II canvasses the relevant standing doctrine. Part III then turns to the 
Bond case to explore its conclusion that individual litigants have Article III standing to vindicate 
the structural constitution. I argue that the relatively parsimonious analysis of Bond majority 
opinion, while not wholly without doctrinal warrant, suppresses much difficulty that ought to be 
aired. More aggressively, I press the position that a contrary holding in Bond would cohere better 
with the assumptions and doctrinal specifications of Article III jurisprudence. Part IV turns from 
doctrine to political economy. Drawing on institutional and public choice analytic tools, I 
identify a range of undesirable effects from permitting individual standing for the structural 
constitution. Based on these doctrinal and political economy analyses, Part V proposes an 
alternative rule that would preclude most (but not all) individual standing for the structural 
constitution.  
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I. Individual Litigants and the Structural Constitution  
 
Structural constitutional questions present to federal courts in several ways. To clarify the 
scope of my argument, I begin by identifying the subset of cases with which I am concerned 
here. I then explain why these cases in fact implicate the defense of structural interests alone, and 
cannot be fairly characterized as involving the defense of some sort of individual right—
specifically, what has been called a right to a valid rule.  
 
A. Structural Constitutional Litigation in Federal Court 
 
 To begin with, what is the class of litigation in which individuals, rather than official, 
institutional actors, bring structural constitutional claims? It is certainly not the entire domain of 
structural constitutional litigation. Institutional actors often press their own constitutional 
interests in federal court. The president, for example, routinely asserts an Article II interest in 
exercising control over administrative agencies. Congress, acting through its committees, can 
also file suit seeking to vindicate constitutionally grounded interests in the midst of inter-branch 
conflicts. States too vindicate federalism interests by resisting national commandeering, asserting 
sovereign immunity, and challenging conditions freighted with federal spending. Indeed, the 
only constitutionally salient institution that lacks the capacity to lodge objections in court on 
structural constitutional grounds is the Article III judiciary itself. With that one exception, the 
doors to the federal courthouse stand, as a practical matter, open to any of the institutional 
entities picked out in the Constitution as salient features of our structural constitution. 
 
 But the courthouse doors also stand open to individual litigants seeking to vindicate 
structural constitutional values. In the separation of powers context, for example, an individual 
litigant can lodge a facial challenge to federal legislation on the ground that it violates some 
aspect of the structural constitutional. Consider the 2010 decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.
 15
 In Free Enterprise Fund, a Nevada accounting 
firm challenged the regulatory authority of the federal Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (“PCAOB”).16 The accounting firm did not assert PCAOB had infringed on any 
constitutionally protected interest that the firm possessed, but rather that the Board’s organic act 
“contravened the separation of powers by conferring wide-ranging executive power on Board 
members without subjecting them to Presidential control.”17 Even though the President evinced 
no wish for greater control of the board,
18
 the Court invalidated one part of PCAOB’s organic 
statute so as to establish more direct presidential control.
19
 Free Enterprise Fund is not an 
outlier. In earlier separation of powers cases, individual litigants have been allowed to raise the 
interests of either Congress or the executive as a shield against regulation or coercive action.
20
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 The same pattern is observed in federalism cases….  
IV. The Political Economy of Standing for the Structural Constitution  
 
This Part turns from an internal to an external perspective—that is, from doctrine to 
political economy. It examines the practical consequences of extending individual standing for 
the structural constitution to individuals. The analysis has two strands that together compound to 
a simple comparative claim—all things considered, the structural constitution is safer in solely 
institutional than in institutional and individual hands.  
 
First, I examine the individual incentives that animate structural constitutional litigation 
using public choice theory. The latter trains on the interest groups that not only drive legislative 
agendas but also deploy judicial review to obtain policy goods they cannot secure in the political 
process.
21
 Notionally a matter of high principle, structural constitutional litigation is not inured 
from interest-group politics. Rather than promoting a desirable structural equilibrium, individual 
standing for the structural constitution will likely promote the exogenous agendas of private 
parties while undermining collective constitutional goods. Second, I consider institutional 
incentives to defend the structural constitution. To this end, I employ what has been termed a 
“new-separation-of-powers approach,” which posits that “we cannot fully understand the 
behavior of one institution without understanding it in the context of the othe[r institutions with 
which it coexists.]”22 No less than legislatures and agencies—the typical focus of the new 
separation-of-powers approach—federal courts are embedded in sequential interactions with 
other government institutions animated by distinctive strategic goals.
23
 This perspective 
generates a relatively optimistic view of institutionally initiated litigation. In tandem, these two 
analyses provide reasons to prefer exclusively institutional standing for the structural constitution 
to the exclusion of individual litigants.  
 
It is important to stress that my argument here is comparative in nature. I do not make the 
(implausible) claim that institutions have perfectly tailored incentives. Instead, I argue that a 
comparison of individual and institutional incentives suggests that we secure more desirable 
results by limiting standing to institutions. 
 
A. Individual Standing for the Structural Constitution Reconsidered  
 
 This Subpart develops two consequentialist arguments against the proposition that 
individuals should have standing to litigate the structural constitution. Together, these arguments 
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undermine the intuitive notion that opening the courthouse door wider to private litigants 
conduces to greater fidelity to the Constitution. The first argument explains why that intuition, 
likely grounded for many in the individual rights context, cannot be translated into the structural 
constitutional context. The second line of attack draws on public choice theory and focuses more 
tightly on private litigants’ likely incentives in practice.  
 
1. The Divergent Goals of Rights and Structural Litigation  
 
Recall that Part III.A posited a distinction between individual rights and structural 
constitutional adjudication—the difference between maximizing and equilibriating. Whereas a 
court’s responsibility respecting individual rights is to maximize the latter within the bounds of 
legitimate state interests, a court’s task in respect to the separation of powers and federalism 
involves a more complex balancing act. A judge facing a structural constitutional question 
cannot merely maximize one value within constraints, but must instead thread carefully between 
several distinct and inconsistent constitutional values to attain a desirable equilibrium. Given the 
distinction between these two goals, it is likely that generous individual standing rules will fit 
comfortably with the courts’ goals in individual rights cases but have perverse, undesired effects 
in structural constitutional litigation.  
 
The distinction I draw here between rights and structural litigation relies on the 
assumption that more permissive standing rules are likely to increase the volume of potential 
litigation and therefore to increase the likelihood of a given constitutional good being vindicated. 
This assumption of a positive correlation between standing rules and litigation outputs rests on 
simple, if not wholly uncontroversial, premises. To air these premises, consider a counterfactual 
world in which a constitutional value—say, the Establishment Clause—can only be enforced by 
litigants who cannot choose to opt out of the challenged government institution.
24
 In this 
counterfactual world, school children could challenge graduation prayers, but citizens could not 
challenge religious displays in public buildings. Courts would not be able to confront all 
government practices that might trench on Establishment Clause values. Moreover, judges 
receive only a weak signal that there is any reason for concern about impermissible 
establishment outside Article III parameters. On the other hand, imagine a world of generous 
standing to challenge alleged establishments in schools, government buildings, official practices, 
and even coinage. The larger volume of persons with relevant injuries makes it more likely that 
courts will be presented with fact-patterns raising all potential ways in which a constitutional 
good can be violated. Litigants will have many more opportunities to raise challenges, to 
distinguish earlier precedent, and to locate sympathetic plaintiffs. To the extent they plough their 
furrows in a common-law, incrementalist vein, judges also have more opportunities to explicate 
and thus reinforce the constitutional value. More permissive standing rules additionally have 
epistemic pay-offs for judges. And with more potential plaintiffs, it is more likely that courts will 
quickly promulgate decision rules dealing with all possible ways in which a right can be 
compromised.
25
 In all these ways, a greater volume of potential litigants increases the courts’ 
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ability to vindicate constitutional rights to their fullest extent possible within the bounds of 
legitimate state interests.
26
 To be sure, it is certainly possible that courts will reject Establishment 
Clause claims across the board. But it is still much more likely that the relevant constitutional 
good will be enforced in expectation.
27
 
 
In the individual rights domain, courts’ goal of maximizing the attainment of rights 
means that more expansive judicial vindication of a constitutional good is, all things considered, 
likely to be desirable. Broader standing means that the shadow of judicial intervention is more 
likely to have a general deterrence in addition to a specific deterrence effect. As one 
commentator explains, “[t]he availability of private suits [will] increase the likelihood that 
enforcement actions will occur, and, as a result, would cause more potential defendants to refrain 
from conduct they would otherwise engage.”28  
 
By contrast, the goal of structural constitutional litigation is the more delicate task of 
attaining and maintaining an appropriate interbranch or intergovernmental equilibrium. 
Increasing the volume of litigants will not necessarily conduce to this balancing goal. The net 
effect of a larger volume of litigation on either the federal or interbranch balance depends on the 
precise content of that engorged litigant flow. For permissive individual standing rules to yield 
desirable results, the expected stream of individual litigants alleging structural constitutional 
error would have to be composed in such a way as to anticipate and produce the right interbranch 
or intergovernmental balance. For example, it would be necessary to have just the right number 
of litigants pressing states’ rights and just the right number of countervailing litigants trumpeting 
the national government’s interests. In the separation of powers domain, each branch would also 
need its own (numerically correctly proportioned) cadre of champions in court.
29
 In short, it 
would be necessary to have a population of litigants precisely composed of the right sort of 
claimants to avoid lopsided imbalances in favor of either a particular branch or particular level of 
government. But there is simply no reason to believe we possess such good fortune. Nor can we 
plausibly posit some providential invisible hand to assure the correct distribution of litigants.  
 
Optimistic predictions are rendered even more improbable by two aspects of current 
standing doctrine. First, the doctrinal rule against generalized grievances ensures that judicial 
coverage of structural constitutional issues will be patchy. Even under an expansive view of 
individual standing for the structural constitution, not all structural principles have proved to be 
justiciable. Two examples from the separation of powers context illustrate. First, the Framers 
included provisions in Article I to prevent the executive from “seducing congressmen with 
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government sinecures” or bribing them with “double salaries or make-work jobs.”30 The Court, 
however, has treated these ‘anti-entanglement’ rules as nonjusticiable. Hence, violations of the 
Emoluments Clause
31
 generate no actionable injury,
32
 and violations of the Ineligibility Clause
33
 
similarly create no individual Article III plaintiffs.
34
 In each line of cases, the bar to generalized 
grievances shuts down enforcement of elements in the structural constitution designed to prevent 
excessive interbranch overlap.
35
 As a result, the institutional design principle of restricting 
impermissible interbranch entanglements will be systematically underenforced because of a 
consistent undersupply of eligible plaintiffs.
36
 At the same time, other elements of the 
Constitution that have a checking effect through mandatory interbranch entanglements—e.g., 
impeachment, the veto, and the senatorial confirmation role in appointments—all operate with 
judicial enforcement. The net result is quantitative unevenness in judicial vindication of the 
structural constitution as interbranch checks are enforced, but limits on interbranch 
entanglements are not.  
 
A second example of the unbalancing consequences of access rules concerns the 
allocation of law-making power. With the exception of two seemingly “aberration[al]” outliers in 
the 1930s, the Court has declined to enforce any strong constraint on the quantum of delegation 
from Congress to the executive branch.
37
 At the same time, the Court has also continued to allow 
plaintiffs to challenge legislative efforts to regulate delegations post hoc.
38
 Another asymmetry 
ensues. The Court evinces large deference to political branches’ institutional choices along one 
margin, hence enabling large institutional change. But then, along another diametrically opposed 
margin, it “prevents … compensating adjustment from being made by any institution, short of 
obtaining a constitutional amendment.”39 The result is that interest groups have ample 
opportunities to mobilize in the courts—but only with respect to violations of Article I by 
Congress, not converse executive abrogations of legislative power. Again, the expected result of 
such uneven access to the federal courts is not a desirable structural equilibrium, but imbalanced 
and erratic outputs. 
 
Asymmetries of the sort identified here are hardly unique to the separation of powers. In 
the federalism domain, the Court has treated some federal governmental obligations toward the 
state as nullities on justiciability grounds. Individuals seeking to invoke states’ interests created 
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by the Elections Clause of Article have been turned away at the courthouse door.
40
 Similarly, 
efforts to invoke the federal obligation to maintain states’ “Republican Form of Government” 
have been blocked on political-question grounds.
41
 Even as the Court has assiduously tended to 
one side of the federalism dynamic, it thus systematically fails to enforce positive duties owed by 
the national government to the states. In the end, these asymmetries mean the courts will 
systematically slight some aspects of the interbranch or intergovernmental balance, even as other 
aspects secure plenary vindication. 
 
The second reason for expecting distorted outcomes from individual standing focuses on 
the doctrinal details of standing: the injury-of-fact, causation, and redressibility elements of the 
doctrine as now drawn virtually guarantee the uneven distribution of individual litigation over 
structural constitution values.  
 
Consider, by way of a motivating example, the legislative veto, which was invalidated in 
1983 in INS v. Chadha.
42
 Congress had been using simple resolutions to direct cabinet secretaries 
to engage in investigations and issue reports since at least 1903.
43
 A first legislative veto was 
enacted in 1932—more than fifty years before the Chadha opinion.44 It is surely worth inquiring 
as to why there was an absence of constitutional challenges to the legislative veto for about half a 
century.
45
 One possible explanation is that Congress did not need to use the legislative veto 
frequently in order to influence executive-branch behavior—the mere shadow of congressional 
responses was sufficient to induce desired agency policies.
46
 If legislative vetoes were largely 
anticipated by agencies unwilling to antagonize their congressional paymasters, we would expect 
to see less agency slack and few instances in which Congress in fact deployed the veto. 
Anticipated responsiveness on the executive’s part, however, would drain the pool of individuals 
who could satisfy the injury in fact, causation, and redressibility requirements of Article III 
standing.
47
 At the same time, Congress would still obtain roughly the results it would have 
obtained via active use of the veto.  
 
Alternatively, a structural constitutional violation may generate no litigants with Article 
III standing because it throws up only immediate winners. Hence, the White House might accept 
an unconstitutional restriction upon its appointment or directive authority because it is in the 
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short-term political interest of an Oval Office incumbent. Or states might accept an 
impermissible intrusion on their regulatory jurisdiction to gain cost-savings. The Constitution 
may be violated in both cases, but all those directly affected are beneficiaries of the violation. 
And beneficiaries cannot sue. This problem is somewhat parallel to the concern with “givings” 
identified by property scholars as the hidden corollary of the takings problem. Roughly speaking, 
a ‘givings’ arises when “the value of … property increases as a result of governance action” even 
if the government does not act directly on the property.
48
 Like takings, givings implicate fairness, 
efficiency, and anti-rent-seeking concerns.
49
 Yet givings are largely off the judicial radar. The 
result is a skewed jurisprudence that often gives a free pass to rent-seeking and other foibles 
supposedly parried by the Taking Clause.
50
 The same concerns, mutatis mutandi, arise in the 
structural constitutional context, when constitutional violations produce an immediate social 
welfare surplus that can be used to buy off all relevant parties. 
 
Even when a constitutional violation has more tangible consequences, affected interest 
groups may still not have a sufficient injury in fact. For example, in some instances a violation of 
the separation of powers results in a loss of information for the public. Absent a statutory basis 
for suit, however, no individual plaintiff has standing. Thus, in United States v. Richardson,
51
 the 
Court held that a member of the public could not challenge violations of the Accounts Clause of 
Article I, Section 9,
52
 based on the federal government’s failure to publish a budget for the 
Central Intelligence Agency. In this fashion, the constitutional floor for injury-in-fact shapes the 
universe of structural constitutional litigation filed. Along with the anticipated response problem 
and the bar to beneficiary standing, the boundaries on injury-in-fact thus provide another reason 
to anticipate lopsided results when individuals vindicate the structural constitution. 
 
2. Public Choice and Structural Constitutional Litigation 
 
The second consequentialist argument against individual standing for the structural 
constitution focuses more narrowly on the likely incentives of litigants. Incentives matter 
because litigation is costly. Not all potential litigants will therefore file suit. To understand the 
consequences of granting individuals standing to litigate the structural constitution, it is 
necessary to model the reasons individuals have for having recourse to the courts. Public choice 
theory furnishes a basis for such predictions. Developed first in the 1980s, public choice involves 
application of economic models to political institutions. Scholars identified the relative cost of 
collective action for interest groups of varying size as a basis for predictions about the kind of 
legislative consequences (if any) the clash of interest groups would generate.
53
 Drawing on 
Mancur Olsen’s pioneering work, which emphasized the high transaction costs encumbering 
large organizations,
54
 they predicted that smaller, more concentrated groups would be the more 
effective lobbyists.
55
 To be sure, public choice’s elegant predictions have been complicated and 
                                                 
48
 See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 551 (2001).  
49
 Id. at 577–90.  
50
 Id. at 615–16 (proposing changes to policy and doctrine). 
51
 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974). 
52
 U.S. Const. Art. I, §9, cl.7. 
53
 STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note --, at 69–72 (outlining simple model offered by James Wilson and Michael 
Hayes).  
54
 MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GOODS 2 (1965). 
55
 See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976). 
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qualified by evidence that different policies generate different patterns of enactment costs,
56
 and 
that interest-group coalitions tend to be complex and not easily reducible to a ‘small group’ or 
‘large group.’57 But the theory’s core insight—that public policy is the product of competition 
between private interest groups for legislative influence—remains both valid and illuminating. 
 
Public choice insights spill over into the judicial domain. Courts, no less than legislatures, 
are arenas for interest group mobilization, and public choice tools can be used to predict which 
when private actors will invest in efforts to secure policy change through the courts.
58
 Of course, 
interest groups do not influence federal judges in the same way that they obtain leverage over 
legislators. Federal judges do not stand for reelection.
59
 They also operate under tight 
“institutional constraints” that limit their ability to reward interest group entreaties.60 Interest 
groups may nonetheless seek to influence appointments on the theory that judicial ideology 
predicts voting behavior after appointment.
61
 And even after a judge is confirmed, interest 
groups can influence the sequence and type of cases lodged before tribunals as a way of molding 
the path of the law. After all, without a litigant well resourced and motivated enough to challenge 
a law, no court will discover a given constitutional flaw.  
 
Standing doctrine plays a gatekeeping function in the political economy of interest-group 
competition over the direction of judicial interpretations of the Constitution. All else being equal, 
a more permissive version of standing, vesting individuals, as well as institutions, with 
courthouse access, will generate a greater volume of strategic litigation. Narrowing the 
courthouse door by limiting the class of constitutionally permissible plaintiffs chokes off 
interest-group incentives to invoke judicial review and so slows the rate of judicial policy 
change.  
 
Once the courthouse door is open, however, the play of incentives and interests will 
determine the net effect of litigation. Given permissible standing rules, public choice theory 
predicts that it will most likely be interest groups with relatively large incentives and small 
collective-action costs who will invoke federal-court jurisdiction in the name of the structural 
constitution. All other things being equal, this suggests that it will be “regulated industries [that 
are sufficiently] well-financed and well-organized, especially when compared to the general 
public and public interest groups”62 that file suit. Such “[s]mall intensely interested groups are … 
likely to spend more on their litigation efforts than any large diffuse groups opposing them … 
                                                 
56
 Voter distaste for a policy can drive up the ‘price’ of that policy. See Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C. Munger, 
Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89, 99 (1986). 
Group size may also be uncorrelated to interest groups’ ability to supply information, which is argued to be the 
principal currency of lobbying. See Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as a Legislative Subsidy, 100 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69, 69 (2006). 
57
 FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY 26 (2009) 
(noting “a surprising tendency for sides to be heterogeneous”). 
58
 F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison, Interest Groups and the Courts, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 953, 967 (1998).  
59
 But see Elhauge, supra note -- , at 82–83 (doubting the efficacy of ex post electoral controls).  
60
 Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU 
L. REV. 827, 827.  
61
 David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1033, 1056 
(2008) (noting “the proliferation of interest groups” involved in the judicial confirmation process). 
62
 Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 22 
(2010). 
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[and] will on balance be able to hire more skilled lawyers and thus have more influence on the 
information presented to the court about the social desirability of the parties' conduct and any 
legal rule under consideration.”63 By comparison, widely diffused and weakly organized sections 
of the public sharing an interest in vindicating a certain vision of the Constitution will often not 
be able to muster the resources to support costly, time-consuming, and uncertain federal-court 
litigation. Even ideological litigants, that is, need to find a sponsor with adequate funds to 
support. With the important exception of criminal cases such as Bond and Lopez, ideologically 
inspired individual litigants will often lack the incentives and resources to pursue a lonely, 
seemingly quixotic crusade through the federal judicial hierarchy.  
 
Under these conditions, the incentives of private litigants in structural constitutional cases 
(including criminal cases) are likely to engender a deregulatory tilt in litigation outcomes.
64
 
Regulated industries and entities, all else being equal, tend to seek a lighter rather than a heavily 
governmental hand (except, to be sure, in instances where regulation preserves a monopoly 
against new entrants). They will therefore tend to use structural constitutional litigation to 
challenge regulation. This deregulatory slant can be observed in some recent developments in the 
scope of the Commerce Clause
65
 and the emergent body of removal-power jurisprudence.
66
 In 
both domains, major challenges to federal laws such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the federal 
healthcare law have pursued a deregulatory agenda that interest groups had previously pressed, 
unsuccessfully, in Congress. Hence, it is precisely in those rare instances in which a legislative 
coalition is assembled to overcome a well organized and well resourced interest group that 
structural constitutional litigation is likely to be harnessed as yet another veto-gate to delay or 
derail new regulation. To the extent that the legislative process already favors certain the well 
resourced and organized—as public choice theory predicts—judicial review will “only 
exacerbate the influence of interest groups.”67 
 
The deregulatory slant to interest-group incentives means that the net effect of individual 
standing is not likely to align with the equilibrating goal of structural constitutionalism. If 
interest groups that litigate the structural constitution are motivated by a deregulatory agenda, 
there is no reason to expect that they will cease enforcement of a structural constitutional value 
when it has reached its optimal level. To the contrary, they will keep pressing their claims until 
they can squeeze no more private value out of litigation.
68
 Moreover, interest groups might use 
an incremental approach to policy change as a way to carve out potential opponents into 
manageable subcoalitions that can more easily be picked off while also gradually assembling a 
                                                 
63
 Elhauge, supra note --, at 77. 
64
 To be sure, insulation of a policy-making forum through design decisions meant to foster independence from 
exogenous political forces. Seems like an incomplete sentence. See Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr., Electoral 
Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321, 331 (2002) (observing that 
groups that are electorally weak are more likely to insulate their preferred policies by designing independent 
agencies). But the courts remain vulnerable to the influence for interest groups as a consequence of variations in the 
volume and nature of cases filed under different standing and justiciability regimes.  
65
 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
66
 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).  
67
 Elhauge, supra note --, at 67–68. 
68
 It is no response to say that judges can simply cease enforcing structural constitutional rules when the optimum is 
reached. Judges have imperfect information and are prone to errors. They likely use the volume of litigation as a 
signal of how serious underlying constitutional problems are, and will sometimes grant relief by mistake when it is 
unwarranted. 
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larger and larger coalition that is increasingly unstoppable.
69
 This piecemeal approach not only 
enables a divide-and-conquer strategy by litigating interest groups, it also conforms to an 
observed judicial preference for minimalism on the Supreme Court.
70
 Due to these entwined 
dynamics, individual standing can induce larger shifts in structural constitutionalism than what 
may be compelled by the Constitution or socially desirable because “advocates can nudge the 
law to that end step-by-step.”71 In this fashion, the incentives of interest groups will lead to 
highly imperfect enforcement of structural constitutional values.  
 
* * * 
 
Conventional wisdom posits that opening the courthouse door wider necessarily conduces 
to more, and hence better, judicial enforcement of the Constitution. This truism does not hold, 
however, in respect to structural constitutionalism. Instead, asymmetries and gaps in the 
distribution of individual plaintiffs with structural constitutional pleas will generate inconstant 
distributions of judicial enforcement. Analysis of the interest-group determinants of structural 
constitutional litigation compounds the case for skepticism by identifying a further source of net 
imbalance. Rather than promoting constitutional equilibriums, individual standing for the 
structural constitutionalism leaves the basic law in perilous hands.  
 
B. Institutional Standing for the Structural Constitution  
 
This subpart employs the “new separation of powers”72 mode of analysis to interrogate 
whether institutions such as states and branches fare any better as defenders of the structural 
constitution. The new separation of powers approach usefully draws attention to how courts are 
embedded in a larger context of repeated interactions with other branches or the several states, all 
of whom anticipate and respond strategically to each other. Application of this strategic, dynamic 
lens to standing doctrine’s operation surfaces some reasons for thinking that institutional litigants 
pressing structural constitutional claims will do a better job than their individual counterparts. 
Again, it is worth stressing the limited reach of this claim: It is not that institutions have perfect 
incentives, only that they do sufficiently better than individuals that the structural constitution is 
best left in their hands alone.  
 
Begin by considering the design task facing elected actors with respect to any policy 
problem with structural constitutional implications. The separation, checking, and equilibrating 
functions of structural constitutionalism must be achieved within the context of a fluid and 
evolving set of government institutions separated by two centuries from the Framers’ 
presumptions. Elected officials need to make difficult, contextualized decisions about how best 
to create stable institutional arrangements and to honor structural constitutional principles.
73
 
                                                 
69
 The argument here is motivated by Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem with Incrementalism, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 815, 823–24 (2010) (describing a similar dynamic in interest group conflict over regulation).  
70
 See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 3–4 (2011). 
71
 Levmore, supra note --, at 822.  
72
 See de Figueiredo, Jacobi & Weingast, supra note --, at 200. 
73
 Even those who assert their adherence to the Constitution’s original meaning must attend to this problem. For 
example, adjudication of the Line-Item Veto in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), entailed a 
determination as to how to understand the Presentment Clause in an age of omnibus legislation—a question to which 
14 
 
Their deals often reflect the interests of branches and subnational actors, who play roles in the 
legislative process.
74
 Standing doctrine can either open or close the door to post hoc challenges 
to structural arrangement by interest groups that lost out in the legislative process.
75
 More 
permissive standing rules render such arrangements more vulnerable to ex post challenges, and 
hence less valuable in expectation. At a very minimum, therefore, adding individual to 
institutional standing creates a new source of friction on efforts to solve emergent policy puzzles 
through institutional innovation.
76
  
 
The destabilizing effect of individual standing is likely to be much greater than the 
destabilizing effect of institutional standing. Their effects will likely diverge because of the 
different litigation incentives of individuals and institutions. States and branches—unlike 
individuals or interest groups—are necessarily repeat players in their interactions with each 
other. Even if they are influenced by interest-group dynamics, states and branches have an 
incentive not shared by most individual litigants to maintain their reputation as reliable 
interlocutors and bargaining partners. They have this incentive because they normally wish to 
preserve the possibility of beneficial cooperation with other governmental entities in later 
periods.
77
 Institutional actors therefore have some incentive to invoke the judicial process if and 
only if a given law violates some exogenously determined structural rule.
78
 More concretely, the 
Solicitor General, who represents the United States in the Supreme Court is often said to act 
somewhat akin to a “tenth Justice” by “tak[ing] the position that reflects his best judgment of 
what the law is, just as he would if he were literally a Justice.”79 The long-term, institutional 
perspective adopted by the Solicitor General is powerful evidence that institutions’ litigation 
behavior is not wholly reducible to the play of interest-group interests. The same is also likely to 
be true of states’ attorneys general, if to a lesser degree. Institutional actors thus have less 
incentive to invoke judicial review if it means unraveling a deal in which they have participated. 
Even if institutions have standing to bring structural constitutional challenges, therefore, they has 
some incentive to accept the accommodations and innovations necessary to preserve basic 
aspects of the constitutional architecture against shifting political, social, and economic trends.
80
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
there is no obvious originalist answer, and which divided the Court’s two originalists, Justice Thomas and Justice 
Scalia.  
74
 See JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL 
POLICYMAKING 215 (2009). 
75
 Cf. de Figueiredo & de Figueiredo, supra note --, at 168–69 (modeling legislation and litigation as a unified, two-
stage sequence). 
76
 Given the strong status quo bias of Article I, §7’s bicameralism and presentment process, it is hard to see why this 
friction is warranted.  
77
 On the evolution of cooperative strategy in situations of repeated play, see ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF 
COOPERATION 54 (1984).  
78
 This is so even if officials’ actions partly reflect the play of interest-group forces in Congress. It is reasonable to 
assume there is some dampening effect as a consequence of professional and bureaucratic norms.  
79
 David A. Strauss, The Solicitor General and the Interests of the United States, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 
168, 172 (1998). To be clear, Strauss is making a normative claim here, albeit one that he sees as having some 
resonance in practice. 
80
 By no stretch of the imagination is this tendency universal. One might fairly criticize the state litigant in New York 
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), for being willing to renege on a complex deal it had reached with other states 
to resolve an intractable interstate commerce problem. 
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The incentives of individuals, by contrast, are unconstrained by the allure of potential 
gains from repeated interactions and the compulsion to preserve reputation. Rather, many 
litigants will be one-shot players, or at best representatives of interest groups pursing self-
interested strategies orthogonal to the goals of preserving structural constitutional principles or 
maximizing overall social welfare. Unlike institutional actors, they have an incentive to file suit 
when a legislative intervention impedes their interests, whether or not the new law violates a 
structural constitutional principle. Provided expected litigated costs are sufficiently low, interest 
groups have an incentive to challenge valid as well as invalid arrangements in the hope that a 
federal judge errs and invalidates the rule.
81
 The hope is not baseless. Judges are at a large 
comparative institutional disadvantage when it comes to determining whether and how different 
aspects of national constitutional design interact and either do or do not offset each other.
82
 
Individual litigants’ strategy of maximizing private gains from structural litigation—a goal that 
institutional litigants do not share—therefore presses outcomes away from desirable interbranch 
and intergovernmental equilibriums.  
 
To be sure, expanding standing for the structural constitution to include individuals does 
yield one benefit: the likelihood of unconstitutional arrangements being challenged and 
invalidated goes up. But it is hard to see why this should be decisive. Institutions such as states 
and branches already have some quantum of motivation to defend their own prerogatives. To be 
sure, office holders may not always be motivated by the best interests of their institutions. But 
this worry is easy to overdo: there is plenty of evidence that participants in the American 
political system take seriously values of legality and constitutionality. Further, it is hardly clear 
that allowing post hoc interventions by individual litigants would remedy office-holders’ lack of 
motivation to defend institutional prerogatives. Those individual litigants have even less reason 
to care about the constitutional balance. They are more likely to be focused on the instrumental 
deployment of structural constitutional principles as devices to attain other exogenous policy 
ends. And it is passing odd to say that since office-holders are distracted from the pursuit of 
structural constitutional values by parochial political concerns, the very interest groups driving 
those narrow, political goals should be authorized to take up the baton of institutional interests in 
federal court. It is less odd to think that even if officials are influenced by interest groups, they 
nonetheless have some independence of action, seem to take institutional perspectives, and 
anticipate iterative interactions in ways that distinguish them from individuals.  
 
* * * 
 
In short, whereas there are powerful arguments against individual standing for the 
structural constitution, there are at least colorable arguments that institutional standing alone will 
do an adequate (but hardly perfect) job. Individual standing in this context will tend to 
destabilize the federal-state and interbranch balances. By contrast, states and the political 
branches will often be motivated by more desirable incentives than individual litigants because 
                                                 
81
 Would injury-in-fact doctrine as it currently exists prevent this kind of strategic litigation? I doubt it. Cf. Abram 
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they are more deeply embedded in institutional cultures and iterative interactions. Comparative 
analysis in sum suggests that individual standing should be discarded in favor of institutional 
standing alone in structural constitutional cases.  
V. Recalibrating Standing for the Structural Constitution  
 
 If the doctrinal and institutional consequences of allowing individuals access to the 
federal courts to pursue structural constitutional arguments are unwelcome, how should 
constitutional law change? This Part proposes a new gloss on standing doctrine that would 
mitigate the undesirable consequences cataloged in Parts II and III. The aim of my proposed 
doctrinal reform is narrowly drawn. I do not propose to render structural constitutional litigation 
wholly nonjusticiable. Perhaps that result is justified on other grounds. But I have not argued for 
that much larger shift in the judicial role here. Eschewing any such ‘bait and switch’, the 
proposal detailed here would mitigate the deleterious effects of individual standing for the 
structural constitution without wholly removing the courts from the business of structural 
constitutional enforcement.  
 
The proposed new rule for standing in respect to the structural constitution goes as 
follows: When an individual litigant seeks to enforce a structural constitutional principle 
redounding to the benefit of an official institution, and there is no reason the latter could not 
enforce that interest itself, a federal court should not permit the individual litigant to allege and 
obtain relief on the basis of the separation of powers or federalism. In the mine run of cases, it is 
the case that the branch, the state, or an official of one of these governmental entities will have 
standing to raise a claim. Congress or the executive, that is, can and do sue to protect Article I or 
Article II prerogatives. States can challenge laws that exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause 
authority, as the recent healthcare litigation shows, or its authority under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In most cases, therefore, this categorical rule bars individual standing. 
In a subset of cases, however, it permits third-party standing on behalf of the structural 
constitution when there is a first-party litigant available to defend a constitutional value in court. 
 
[The paper proceeds to elaborate this idea at greater length] 
